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Early warning systems (EWSs) are subject to restrictions that apply to exchange 
rates in general: fundamentals matter but their influence is small and unstable. Keep-
ing this in mind, five lessons emerge: First, EWSs have robust forecasting power and 
thus help policy-makers to prevent crises. Second, among competing crisis defini-
tions there is one which is most practical. Third, take a logit model to condense in-
formation from various fundamental variables. Fourth, add a regional contagion 
dummy to the standard set of variables. Fifth, one may be tempted to address insta-
bility over time and countries by taking shorter samples and regional EWSs. 
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Robust Lessons about Practical Early Warning Systems 
 
1 Introduction 
Financial crises have not declined in number, frequency or severity over the last 
two decades, rather the contrary (Bordo et al., 2001). Each crisis causes enormous 
costs in the countries concerned. Even if many crises may help to promote overdue 
structural change, they are costly and it is a worthwhile objective to realize adjust-
ments without this heavy toll. Thus, international financial institutions invest in re-
searching early warning systems (EWS).
2 There is now a wide range of studies 
available, however, without real converging results: studies vary in coverage of coun-
tries and time, they apply different methods and they may even define crises quite 
differently. So are there any robust findings that might help policy makers? This pa-
per does not add another EWS to the existing body of literature but systematically 
analyzes the robustness of main approaches. It is shown that, indeed, most findings 
critically depend on their empirical design. EWSs are a somewhat dubious subject 
from this perspective. However, there also emerge robust lessons that help us to bet-
ter understand and implement EWSs. 
The modern approaches to understanding determinants of currency crises 
started in the early 1990s. The largely unexpected shake-up of the European Mone-
tary System in 1992/93 motivated Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1995, 1996). 
Thereafter, attention focused more on developing countries (Frankel and Rose, 
1996), spurred by the Mexican crisis (e.g. Sachs, Tornell and Velasco, 1996) and, 
above all, by the Asian crisis (e.g. Kaminsky, 1998, Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart, 
1998, Berg and Pattillo, 1999). More currency crises followed, e.g. major ones in 
Russia and Argentina, stimulating ongoing research in common factors and an opti-
mal EWS design. In the beginning, efforts were directed into analyzing an increasing 
set of variables, collecting larger samples and introducing multivariate techniques. 
Recent trends in this field point towards further modifications in method, such as ap-
plying a multinomial logit approach (Bussiere and Fratzscher, 2002), a Markov 
Switching approach (Martinez-Peria, 2002, Abiad, 2003) and extreme value theory to 
                                                           
2  See for example Berg et al. (2000) as well as the many studies conducted by IMF staff (e.g. Kamin-
sky, Lizondo and Reinhart, 1998, Berg and Pattillo, 1999, 1999a, Edison, 2003, Abiad, 2003, and 
Sy, 2004). Furthermore, see Kamin, Schindler and Samuel (2001), representing research by the 
Federal Reserve Board. Bussiere and Fratzscher (2002) provide an example of ECB work on this 
topic.   3
identify crises (Pozo and Amuedo-Dorantes, 2003). Another trend is towards focus-
ing on regional studies, such as Esquivel and Larrain (1999), Brueggemann and 
Linne (2002) or Pasternak (2003). 
The universe of proposed EWSs thus stretches over five dimensions: variables, 
sample period, sample countries, crisis definition and method applied. Each EWS is 
a combination regarding these five dimensions, so that – due to focus and product 
differentiation – usually, results cannot be compared to each other. Moreover, most 
studies do not present extensive robustness checks, so it is not clear which im-
provement claimed will last under different conditions. There is thus an obvious need 
to make results comparable. It is, however, also obvious that due to the complexity 
involved, restrictions are needed. Fortunately, several earlier studies have carefully 
analyzed the usefulness of variables and found that variables often point in the same 
direction, in particular in a multivariate approach. As, moreover, all variables are 
rather more able to give a warning signal of a possible upcoming crisis than predict 
the timing and exact occurrence of the latter, a selection of few meaningful funda-
mental indicators will work (Salvatore, 1999). In this respect we follow the suggestion 
of Berg and Pattillo (1999, p. 573 et sqq.) to rely on their handful of variables only. 
Regarding the issue of robustness, Edison (2003) is the most complete study 
published. She basically extends the leading indicator work of Kaminsky, Lizondo 
and Reinhart (1998) – in short: KLR – in four of the five dimensions mentioned 
above, although with different intensity. Our study also departs from KLR, who pre-
sented the broadest approach at that time and has thus been a benchmark study un-
til today. Going beyond Edison (2003), we systematically apply several methods to 
generate warning signals, we analyze the influence of crisis definition more thor-
oughly and we consider some recent proposals to improve forecasting power of 
EWSs. 
We find, as did Berg and Pattillo (1999) and Edison (2003), that it becomes 
more difficult over time to replicate earlier crisis dates. So the dependent variable 
may change from study to study even if all parameters are kept the same. Fortu-
nately, this haziness in data does not seem to influence results too much. 
Berg and Pattillo (1999) show that a logit approach can improve results of 
EWSs. To some extent, this holds for our extensions, too. We test their logit model 
with variables given as number as well as with variables given in a reduced 0-1-form. 
The two approaches do not differ that much although the reduced form yields some-  4
what better results. One surprise is, however, the implementation of the multinomial 
logit proposed by Bussiere and Fratzscher (2002). This technique does not provide 
the expected useful forecasting results when applied out-of-sample but seems to de-
pend decisively on the underlying data. 
Regarding the crisis definition, it is found that the choice between the several 
definitions offered by the literature is non-trivial. The simplest Frankel and Rose 
(1996) – in short: FR – proposal does not cover typical problems in industrialized 
countries well. The complex Bussiere and Fratzscher (2002) – in short BF – measure 
proves to be stable over time and country extensions but is, due to its construction, 
less sensitive to country-specific characteristics. Furthermore, lack of data can be 
critical. It is thus the KLR measure which seems most practical. 
Further examinations on EWS parameters in order to improve forecasting ability 
reveal that there are indeed options available: we find that the recent trend in the lit-
erature towards focussing on regional EWS has some justification in the sense that it 
helps to improve forecasts. Finally, due to instability over time, shorter samples also 
tend to provide better forecasts. One should be aware, however, that regional EWSs 
as well as shorter samples tend to homogenize the problem: explanations are thus 
"better" because they are easier and not necessarily because one would understand 
better. 
In summary, our understanding of EWSs – which basically aim at predicting lar-
ger exchange rate changes – may be guided by core insights from the empirical ex-
change rate literature: fundamentals matter but their influence is small and unstable 
(Frankel and Rose, 1995, Sarno and Taylor, 2002). Keeping these limitations in 
mind, there emerge five lessons: First, EWSs have robust forecasting power and thus 
help policy-makers to prevent crises. Second, competing crisis definitions have pros 
and cons but the KLR crisis definition is most practical. Third, take a logit model to 
condense information from various fundamental variables. Fourth, add a regional 
contagion dummy to the standard set of about five variables. Fifth, one may be 
tempted to address instability over time and countries by taking shorter samples and 
regional EWSs. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents our ex-
tension of the KLR approach over time and countries. Section 3 examines the advan-
tageousness of several logit approaches compared to the composite indicator. The   5
pros and cons of various crisis definitions are analyzed in Section 4. Further ap-
proaches to improve forecasts are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2 KLR-extensions  over time and countries 
2.1  Reproducing the KLR approach 
In order to tie up to previous research and assure data consistency, we begin 
our robustness analyses with a replication effort of the benchmark KLR approach. 
Starting with the crisis definition, KLR use an index of exchange market pressure (in 
short: EMPI) for each country that is constructed as a weighted average of monthly 
percentage changes in the nominal exchange rate (NER) and in gross international 
reserves (RES). These two components are weighted in such a way that they have 
the same conditional variance. Reflecting the pressure on the currency as an in-
crease of the index, either due to a currency’s depreciation or due to a loss of inter-
national reserves, a crisis (C) is considered a period in which the EMPI is more than 
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Periods of hyperinflation, with price level increases of more than 150% in the 
previous six months, are treated separately, forming sub-samples with extra EMPI 
and crisis calculations for each country. The chosen sample contains 20 countries 
including 15 developing and 5 industrialized countries over the sample period from 
January 1970 to April 1995. The first four columns of Annex 1 give an overview of 
identified crises by KLR and Edison (2003) as well as the results of our own replica-
tions.
3 
After determining the crisis dates, the next step consists of choosing meaningful 
indicators to give a warning signal when crossing a formerly designed threshold 
                                                           
3  All data used derive from the IMF international financial statistics (IFS). When trying to reproduce the 
crises, 2.5 standard deviations instead of 3 above the EMPI mean appear to be most applicable. Our 
proceedings align with Edison (2003, p. 11). Nevertheless, the results are quite astonishing: KLR 
identify 75 crises, Edison finds 70 in the same sample, but only 47 of them match exactly with the 
ones of KLR. Our replication identifies 79 crisis, 36 of them correspond exactly to the original ones, 
45 to the replication by Edison. Berg and Pattillo (1999, p. 565), who as well replicate the KLR 
benchmark, assign these discrepancies to differences in the raw data resulting from data revisions 
and individual data "cleaning". Taking into account that the latter fail to match 14 out of the 75 KLR 
crises only one year later while Edison misses 28 three years afterwards, our results five years later 
appear reasonable.    6
value. KLR identify 13 out of 16 tested variables to be appropriate with the help of the 
so-called (adjusted) noise-to-signal ratio. This ratio contains the number of false sig-
nals as a share of possible false signals (B/B+D), divided by the number of good sig-
nals as a proportion of cases in which good signals could have been issued (A/A+C). 
Good and bad signals are distinguished according to the following matrix. 
 
Crisis  
(Within Next 24 Months)
No Crisis 
(Within Next 24 Months) 
Crisis Signal  A  B 
No Crisis Signal  C  D 
 
With:  A:   Number of months in which the indicator issued a good signal 
B:   Number of months in which the indicator issued a false alarm or "noise", and thus a bad 
signal 
C:  Number of months in which the indicator failed to issue a signal (which would have been a 
good one) 
D:  Number of months in which the indicator desisted from issuing a signal (which would have 
been a bad one) 
 
In order to create an easy-to-handle model we choose the set of 6 variables 
proposed and statistically verified by Berg and Pattillo (1999), namely deviation of 
real exchange rate from trend, growth of international reserves, of exports, and of M2 
to international reserves, as well as current account to GDP and M2 to international 
reserves in levels (for details about the construction of the variables, see Annex 2).  
Following Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1995), Figure 1 sheds light on the 
average movements of the chosen indicators in a 48-month event window around the 
identified crisis dates and their average course in tranquil periods respectively. All 
indicators exhibit clearly perceptible patterns showing that their course is different 
before and after the crisis. 
Table 1 (columns 1-2) presents information on the individual indicator's per-
formance of our replication. For all six variables we reproduce noise-to-signal ratios 
smaller than one and thus consider all variables to contribute meaningfully to an 
EWS. The real exchange rate variable clearly performs best. Our results are in line 
with KLR and former replications. In order to assess the meaning of an indicator's 
signal better, we also calculate the so-called conditional probability (A/A+B) that indi-
cates the probability of the occurrence of a crisis within a 24-month window after the   7
respective indicator has issued a signal. Again, the real exchange rate variable 
proves to be the top performer with a conditional crisis probability of 67% when sig-
nalling.  
 
2.2  Extending KLR over time 
We then extend the KLR sample to a period from January 1970 to December 
2002. This has different implications: First, the EMPI is highly sample-dependent. An 
extension changes not only the country-specific mean but also the calculated stan-
dard deviation. As a consequence, we identify slightly different crisis periods than 
before (see Annex 1, column 5).
4 Taking a closer look at the countries concerned, a 
further conclusion emerges: As countries hit by the Asian financial crisis in 
1997/1998 seem to be especially affected by shifts in crisis periods, one might sup-
pose that heavy crises influence mean and standard deviation in a way that weaker 
crisis signals are no longer identified (e.g. in Malaysia). Thus, the identification of a 
currency crisis with the help of the KLR definition depends critically on the country’s 
historical experiences and the considered time period respectively. 
Second, all six indicators keep their forecasting power with a noise-to-signal ra-
tio smaller than one (see Table 1, columns 1-3). Furthermore, indicators mainly keep 
their performance relative to each other with the real exchange rate variable staying 
the best performer.  
 
2.3  Expanding KLR over countries 
Following Edison (2003), we also consider 8 additional countries which experi-
enced at least one currency crisis. Differently from extensions in a time dimension, 
additional countries have no influence on the crisis identification as the respective 
EMPI and standard deviations are calculated separately for each country. Annex 1 
shows the identified crisis periods for the expanded sample: 104 for the shorter pe-
riod (1970-1995) and 126 for the extended period (1970-2002).  
Table 1 (columns 4-5) sheds light on the indicators' performance after also in-
cluding additional countries. Again, to a great extent, all indicators keep both a noise-
to-signal ratio smaller than one as well as their performance order. The worse results 
for the four variables, real exchange rate, exports, M2 / reserves and M2 / reserves 
                                                           
4  Adding up to 93 crisis periods, 13 of the old ones can no longer be detected. Instead, 26 new crises 
are identified, but only 18 of them can be ascribed to the additional months considered.   8
(level), support the idea that the more (heterogeneous) countries are examined, the 
more difficult it gets to achieve meaningful signals. Nevertheless, all chosen variables 
seem to be adequate.  
 
2.4 Forecasting  out-of-sample 
Up to now, we have only considered the performance of univariate indicators in-
sample. However, in order to assess the applicability of our variables to form an 
EWS, we should assess two further aspects. First, it seems reasonable to analyze 
the indicators' information jointly, as currency crises are often the result of simultane-
ously appearing weaknesses. Second, reliability out-of-sample is most important 
when aiming for a forecast. 
Therefore, in a first step, we define crises for the whole period from 1970 to 
2002, but rely on the period from 1970 to 1995 for crisis identification as well as for 
the design of the single indicator thresholds. The remaining 92 months from May 
1995 to December 2002 represent the out-of-sample test period.  
In a second step, we follow the idea of Kaminsky (1998, p. 14 et sqq.). Having 
looked at each indicator separately so far, we combine the information provided by all 
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Accordingly, the different indicator signals are summed up (ΣS) and weighted 
with their inverse noise-to-signal ratio (1/ω) each). Depending on the number of vari-
ables signaling, the composite indicator can take different values. As pure values of 
the composite indicator do not say anything about the crisis probability, the associ-
ated (conditional) probabilities have to be calculated.  
In a third step, finally, the in- and out-of-sample performance can be assessed. 
When comparing the composite indicator with the best univariate indicator, the real 
exchange rate, two aspects emerge: First, in general, results out-of-sample are (as 
expected) worse in comparison to the in-sample consideration. Second, the compos-
ite indicator clearly outperforms the univariate benchmark, especially out-of-sample. 
As presumed, it is thus worthwhile to continue to work with the combined information 
of different indicators. Our results align with those of Goldstein, Kaminsky, and 
Reinhart (2000, p. 64 et sqq.), and are hence not explicitly displayed here. 
   9
3  From composite indicators to logit models 
In this section, we go beyond the univariate KLR indicator approach and the 
composite indicator as a step towards a multivariate framework. We analyze whether 
multivariate logit models outperform former approaches and which among them 
might be most appropriate for practical purposes. 
 
3.1 Two  logit  model alternatives 
Describing the crisis probability as a non-linear function of different variables, 
logit and probit models feature the possibility of analyzing their statistical significance 
in a multivariate approach. Following Berg and Pattillo (1999; in short BP), we con-
sider the 6 BP variables over the original KLR time and country sample. The vari-
ables enter the logit model in both the binary signal 0-1-form and with continuous 
values, alternatively. So far, we have considered a crisis window of 24 months, i.e. a 
signal is considered to be a good one if an indicator issues a signal and a crisis fol-
lows within the following 24 months. For the logit approach we thus have to trans-
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Table 2 shows the two estimated logit models. In both models, the same four 
variables are significant at the 1% level and their coefficients show the expected and 
correct signs.
5 The odds ratio also displayed permits us to draw conclusions with re-
gard to the conditional probability. If in the binomial logit model with binary signals 
e.g. the exports variable, emits a signal, the crisis probability is about 62.1 % higher 
than without the signal. Again, the real exchange rate variable shows the highest 
conditional probability. 
As before, we are not only interested in in-sample, but also in out-of-sample re-
sults: Our performance assessment both in- and out-of-sample of the two logit alter-
natives in comparison to the composite indicator can be found in Table 3. In order to 
                                                           
5  M2 / reserves as well as CA / GDP are excluded from the logit models due to their lack of signifi-
cance. In the model with variables entering as binary signals, positive coefficients imply a rising cri-
sis probability whenever the indicators cross their formerly designed thresholds and issue crisis sig-
nals. In the model with continuous values, coefficients’ signs vary according to the definition of the 
respective variable. A positive coefficient for the ratio of M2 / reserves (level) e.g. implies a rising cri-
sis probability whenever the ratio heightens. By contrast, expressed by the negative coefficient, de-
creasing reserves growth heightens the crisis probability.   10
assure comparability, we reduce the latter to exactly the same four variables entering 
the binomial logit models. Following Berg and Pattillo (1999), we take the two alterna-
tive cut-off probabilities of 25% and 50% to issue a signal. As the objective of an 
EWS consists in properly forecasting upcoming crises, the percentage of crises 
called correctly can probably be considered the most important criterion. However, 
without taking into account the number of false alarms as well, a performance as-
sessment is only half-hearted.  
At first sight, the trade-off between correctly called crises and false alarms be-
comes obvious and can be seen as valid over all different approaches. Let us take a 
closer look at the in-sample performance of the binary logit with variables entering in 
the form of binary signals, for example: using the 50% cut-off, the last model provides 
an obviously better performance compared to the other two models as far as cor-
rectly signaled crises as well as false alarms are concerned. Bringing the cut-off 
probability down to 25%, the number of correctly called crisis periods is augmented 
to 53% – but at the cost of more false alarms. The models are thus difficult to com-
pare. Out-of-sample, performance results once again worsen compared to in-sample 
estimations. Furthermore, with a 50% cut-off, the composite indicator shows the best 
performance. However, applying a 25% cut-off, it is the binomial logit model with sig-
nals which shows a higher percentage of correctly called crises as well as less false 
alarms. So taking the four cases considered in Table 3 as the benchmark, each of 
the three models is best in one case but only the binary logit model is never the 
worst. 
Though performance results are not unambiguous, the binary logit model 
seems to perform most robustly.  
 
3.2 The  multinomial  logit 
So far, the dependent variable could either take a value of 1, representing a cri-
sis period, or 0 for tranquil times. We thus assumed variables to behave differently in 
crisis and non-crisis times. However, reality is more complex. Variables seem not 
only to deviate from their normal level before but also noticeably after a crisis (see 
Figure 1). Accordingly, instead of comparing only two states (crisis and non-crisis 
times), an EWS could also address what can be called a "post-crisis bias".   11
To our knowledge, Bussiere and Fratzscher (2002) represent the pioneering 
work in this direction and thus form our reference. Instead of a binomial logit model 
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Taking three states into account would presuppose that a mean value compari-
son of the possible three states displays significant differences. The results of our 
analyses for the six indicators shown in Table 4 confirm this. Considering, for exam-
ple, the real exchange rate variable 24 months before and after a crisis respectively, 
a significant difference in mean values becomes obvious. Whereas the average 
value in crisis times is -7.654 and thus implies a negative deviation from the trend, 
representing an overvalued local currency, the mean value for the crisis itself and the 
24 months after the crisis is 10.608. Alternatively, the time window is shortened to 
two times 12 months, but results stay consistent over all variables (and are thus not 
presented here). 
Aiming to assess whether a multinomial logit can really improve crisis recogni-
tion and forecast, Table 5 sheds light on both in- and out-of-sample performance of 
the different types of logit models. In order to make results comparable, we use the 
same four variables for the multinomial as for the binomial logit model.
6 
Three aspects emerge when comparing the multinomial logit model with the bi-
nomial one: First of all, considering both the 25% and 50% cut-off probabilities in 
sample, it is worth doubting whether a multinomial logit model generally improves 
forecasting performance. Different from Bussiere and Fratzscher (2002), we do not 
find superior performance results in comparison to our binomial logit model. Second, 
out-of-sample using a 50% cut-off, the multinomial model seems slightly better than 
the binomial model regarding crisis periods correctly called and false alarms. How-
ever, results are not at all convincing when considering the 25% cut-off probability. 
                                                           
6  For the construction of the multinomial logit model, we rely on Bussiere and Fratzscher (2002, p. 19 
et sqq.). Like them, we choose the tranquil regime as the base regime. We estimate the probabilities 
of being rather in the tranquil period or in a (pre-)crisis or a recovery period according to changes in 
the independent variables. Each observation can be assigned to the state with the highest probabil-
ity. However, in order to take different cut-off probabilities into account, we also include different cut-
off thresholds for signalling a pre-crisis state. In Table 5, the performance results of our estimated 
multinomial logit model are thus compared with those of the binomial logit model using a 25% and a 
50% cut-off probability respectively.   12
Third, a binomial logit model is easier to implement as an EWS and we thus decide 
to continue our work relying on the binomial logit with variables entering in binary 
form to be the best performing method. We now explicitly consider different crisis 
definitions presented in the literature. 
 
4  The impact of different crisis definitions 
Obviously, the robustness question also applies to the kind of crisis definition 
used. Though this part of an EWS can be considered as a more philosophical issue 
as either someone believes something is a crisis or not, there can be at least three 
different kinds of crisis definitions found in the literature, which comprise between 
one and three variables. Moreover, the interpretation of concrete values to be 
reached before a crisis is called differ from study to study. We compare and analyze 
the proposals of Frankel and Rose (1996) and Bussiere and Fratzscher (2002) with 
KLR concerning robustness and stability. 
 
4.1  Applying the crisis definition of Frankel and Rose (FR) 
FR concentrate their study explicitly on currency crashes when analyzing 105 
developing countries on an annual data basis between 1971 and 1992. In contrast to 
KLR, who include both international reserves and the exchange rate – and thus ac-
count for averted as well as successful attacks on the domestic currency, FR focus 
on the latter. According to their definition, a crisis is considered a period of a nominal 
exchange rate (NER) devaluation of at least 25%. Additionally, in order to take hyper-
inflation into account, at the same time this has to comply an exceeding of the previ-
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They admit that their cut-off points are somewhat arbitrary but sensitivity analy-
ses support the settings. The idea of adding a second criterion is supported by 
Esquivel and Larrain (1999, p. 8) who also try to ensure in their work that only mean-
ingful currency devaluations (in the sense of those effecting the purchasing power 
parity) are considered as crises.   13
We apply the FR definition to the original KLR sample as well as to the enlarged 
country sample, both from 1970 to 1995 and to 2002 respectively. Because the crisis 
definition has no sample dependent elements, in contrast to the KLR definition, nei-
ther sample extensions nor expansions should have any impact on the identified cri-
sis in the small sample. Due to our use of monthly instead of annual data, we have to 
allow for some small modifications in the crisis definition: Both criteria, the 25% de-
valuation as well as the 10% change, apply to monthly instead of annual reference. 
Furthermore, we correspondingly shorten the proposed 3-year windowing by FR 
(1996, p. 358) to three months.
7  
Annex 1 (column 6) shows our results. We identify 84 crisis periods in the ex-
tended KLR sample when using the modified FR definition. It is conspicuous that nei-
ther in Colombia, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Spain nor in Malaysia and 
Thailand, are crisis times detected, whereas our calculations using the KLR definition 
identify 32 crisis dates in these countries.
8 In other words: both the EMS crisis in 
1992/1993 as well as the Asian Crisis in 1997/1998 seem to be largely missed when 
applying the definition of FR.  
As far as the remainder of the countries are concerned, two further aspects 
should be mentioned. On the one hand, the majority of the other KLR crisis periods 
are exactly reproduced by the Frankel and Rose definition. This seems logical as 
KLR use a wider definition, implying that the one of FR is a necessary though not a 
sufficient condition. On the other hand, however, in 10 of the remaining countries, 
especially the Latin American ones, the FR definition provides noticeably more crisis 
times. These findings support two conclusions: Firstly, the existence of different crisis 
types (either mainly driven by the exchange rate or by the loss of reserves), and sec-
ondly, the distinct appearance of different crisis types depending on the chosen re-
gion analyzed. 
In order to counteract an unavoidable bias when including countries that did not 
experience at least one crisis between 1970 and 1995, we drop those countries from 
further analyses. Results of our binomial logit model with variables in the binary 0-1 
                                                           
7  The transformation from yearly to monthly data is of course arbitrary. Godfjan and Valdés (1998), for 
example, take a 2-month window when reproducing Frankel and Rose. 
8  Expanding the original KLR sample to 28 countries reveals a similar picture: In Greece, India, Portu-
gal and Singapore no crises can be identified. Additional countries thus only augment the number of 
identified crisis periods by 4 to 88 crises in the large extended sample.   14
form are displayed in Table 6 (columns 1-2 and 4).
9 In-sample results are better in 
comparison to those when applying the KLR definition. Considering e.g. the 50% cut-
off probability, using the FR definition leads to 35% of correctly called crises at a cost 
of 33% of false alarms. When applying the KLR definition 27% of the crises are 
called correctly while 34% of the alarms are false (see Table 3 for comparison). 
However, out-of-sample, with coefficients gained for the in-sample periods and then 
applied out-of-sample, the logit model using the KLR definition clearly outperforms 
the one with the FR definition: While the FR model calls 17% of the crises correctly at 
a cost of 89% of false alarms, the percentage of crises correctly called by the KLR 
model amounts to 20%, accompanied by the distinctively smaller number of 76% of 
false alarms. 
To summarize, in-sample FR performance results are convincing, out-of-
sample, the FR logit model is beaten by the KLR model. Moreover, two aspects 
should be considered most skeptically: The performance tests for FR are based on a 
small sample of quite homogenous countries. Neither the EMS nor the Asian crisis is 
largely identified. We doubt that an exclusive concentration on currency crashes is 
warranted for a practical EWS covering a wide set of heterogeneous countries. 
 
4.2  The crisis definition of Bussiere and Fratzscher (BF) 
Whereas FR reduce the KLR definition to the exchange rate focus, BF enlarge it 
by additionally considering interest rate changes. They base their decision on the 
idea that a central bank has mainly three options to respond to speculative attacks: In 
order to stabilize the exchange rate the bank can either augment the interest rate or 
sell international reserves. A third option would be to let market forces work and thus 
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Aiming to avoid sample splits due to hyperinflation periods, they concentrate on 
the real effective instead of the nominal exchange rates (REER). Accordingly, they 
                                                           
9  Results of the univariate indicators' performance assessment are not explicitly displayed here but 
can be summed up to the following aspects: First, again, the real exchange rate variable stays the 
top performer over all variations, while CA / GDP performs worst. Second, the six variables mainly 
keep their performance relative to each other. Third, as noise-to-signal ratios worsen to a great ex-  15
consider real interest rates (r). The single components are weighted with their inverse 
sample variance over all countries for the whole period: the higher the variance, the 
smaller their weight. Originally, a crisis is considered a period when the EMPI is at 
least two standard deviations above its country average.
 10 
Again, Annex 1 (columns 7 to 10) shows the results after applying the BF defini-
tion to the original KLR sample and its variations. Compared to the crisis definitions 
of KLR and FR, we identify a reduced number of crises for the original KLR sample. 
23 of the identified 55 comply with those using the KLR definition, only 17 with the 
one of the FR definition.  
As the crisis definition of BF, like the one of KLR, depends on the considered 
sample, both time extensions and additional countries can change the results. A time 
extension leads to a total of 83 crisis periods between 1970 and 2002. Only one cri-
sis of the original sample can (due our 3-months windowing) no longer be detected. 
11 crisis times are identified additionally between 1975 to 1995. In contrast to KLR, 
where heavy crises are supposed to exert a huge influence on the crisis definition 
and thus smaller crises can no longer be detected, this effect cannot be observed 
here. Accordingly, the BF definition is quite stable concerning outliners. Both EMS 
and Asian Crisis are recognized well. Interestingly, relative stability and recognition 
also remain when adding further countries. After the extension, we identify 76 crises 
for the shorter and 101 crises for the larger sample respectively. Detected crisis times 
in the expanded sample match, to a great extent, those identified in the small sample 
and only miss out few of the latter. In two countries (Portugal and South Africa) no 
crisis period at all can be detected. These countries are thus dropped from further BF 
analyses.  
Table 6 (columns 3 and 5) unveils the in- and out-of-sample performance of the 
logit model when using the BF definition.
11 Both in- and out-of-sample, the percent-
age of crises correctly called is lower than those using the KLR (see Table 3 for 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
tent with additional countries and time extensions, results support the assumption that the more 
(heterogeneous) countries examined, the more difficult it gets to reach meaningful signals. 
10   For our reconstruction we slightly modify the definition by taking real exchange rates. Furthermore, 
when trying to reproduce the results of BF, we find a 2.5 standard deviation to be most appropriate.  
11 Similar to the former assessment of the definition of FR, results of the univariate analysis are not 
explicitly shown here. They can be summarized as follows: The real exchange rate once more stays  
top performer over all variations whereas export growth performs worst. The other four indicators 
slightly vary their performance relative to each other but generally noise-to-signal ratios proof to be 
stable to extensions over time and countries.   16
comparison) and the FR definition respectively. At the same time, false alarms are 
comparable or even higher. 
To conclude, the definition of BF shows a high stability over time and country 
variations. Admittedly, as EMPI variances are calculated over the whole sample pe-
riod, the crisis definition seems less sensitive to country specific characteristics. Per-
formance results, however, especially the percent of crises correctly called, are not 
fully convincing. Furthermore, restricted data availability and the lack of consistency 
in the interest rate data should be taken into account when choosing the BF defini-
tion. 
 
5  Further lessons for improving forecasts 
So far, we have analyzed different methodological approaches as well as three 
crisis definitions over different sample periods and countries. Three further aspects 
emerge: There can be observed a recent trend to downsize analyzed samples by 
focusing on selected regions when scrutinizing EWSs (see Esquivel and Larrain, 
1999, Brueggemann and Linne, 2002). Others apply different approaches to one 
country (see e.g. Alvarez-Plata and Schrooten, 2003, 2004) or choose single exam-
ples of few countries to assess the proposed technique (see Abiad, 2003, for exam-
ple). It seems interesting to examine what happens if the sample is split up into re-
gional sub-samples. Furthermore, we want to assess whether shortening samples 
could improve results. The third aspect addresses another growing body of empirical 
literature: the danger of contagion.  
 
5.1  Regional sample splits 
The KLR sample comprises a very heterogeneous set of countries. Applying the 
FR definition has shown that different types of crisis seem to be attributable to differ-
ent countries. We thus analyze the robustness of former results with the help of the 
KLR crisis definition and the expanded sample across three different regions: Latin 
America, Asia and Europe.  
As before, we focus exclusively on the multivariate approach.
12 The outcome is 
shown in Table 7. Latin American results, in- and out-of-sample, outperform those of 
                                                           
12 Regional performance results of the individual indicators are not explicitly displayed here but can be 
resumed briefly. All three regions have the top indicator in common: It is once more the exchange 
rate variable. All the same, differences across the regions become also evident with one aspect 
which is worth mentioning: all Latin American variables display consistently better noise-to-signal ra-  17
the other two regions. Especially out-of-sample, an explicit application of the pre-
sented model on Asia or Europe does not seem to make sense as crisis periods are 
no longer recognized and in Europe even false alarms skyrocket. Taking into account 
that the FR crisis definition, relying exclusively on the exchange rate, recognizes 
more Latin American crises than the other two definitions, and the real exchange rate 
variable proves its star performer quality one more time, results are not surprising.  
To conclude, deviations between different regions exist. In order to improve an 
EWS’ forecasting performance while still relying on a broad set of countries consid-
ered, some of the regional commonality might also be brought to an EWS by adding 
a regional dummy variable. 
 
5.2  Shortening the sample 
We continue our robustness analyses with a split in time dimension. Based on 
Choueiri and Kaminsky (1999), who find supporting evidence for a change in the na-
ture of crises over time, the hitherto considered sample period of 25 years (1970 to 
1995) might appear too long for reliable coefficients over time. Supposing shorter 
sample periods to reveal somewhat better results due to a higher crisis homogeneity, 
we divide the extended sample period from 1970 to 2002 into three sub-periods: the 
first one ranging from 1970 to 1980, the second from 1981 to 1990 and the third from 
1991 to 2002.  
Table 8 displays the multivariate in-sample performance with the help of well-
known binomial logit models. We take the logit model for the period from 1970 to 
1995 as a benchmark to compare it with the full sample (1970-2002) and with distinc-
tively shorter samples. The assumption that shorter samples might improve perform-
ance can be confirmed, especially for a 25% cut-off probability. Nevertheless, per-
formance results vary clearly with the periods considered. The overall most convinc-
ing performance is reached for the 1970s. Independently of the chosen cut-off-
probability the logit model for the period between 1970 and 1980 outperforms the 
other ones. For the two other periods, between 1981 and 1990 as well as the 1990s 
up to 2002, results once again face the problem of setting the right threshold and 
balancing correctly called crises and false alarms. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
tios than in Europe and Asia. These results are in line with Edison (2003) who assesses differences 
between Asia and Latin America and also gets clearly better performance results for the latter.   18
5.3 Grasping  contagion 
The idea of capturing the risk of one country being affected by another country’s 
crisis – either due to regional proximity (like the experience of the Asian crisis of 1997 
has shown) or because of similar characteristics that seem to overcome regional dis-
tance (e.g. the affection of Russia by the Tequila crisis in 1994) – is one of the sub-
jects given the most emphasis in current research on financial crisis. Efforts to char-
acterize, to prove and to analyze financial contagion are numerous (for a survey, see 
Moser, 2003, Karolyi, 2003 or Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh, 2003). Mainly three 
channels of transmission can be identified in the literature: Firstly, effects can spill 
over due to bilateral or multilateral trade linkages (see Eichengreen, Rose and Wy-
plosz, 1996, Glick and Rose, 1999). Secondly, those countries either exposed to the 
same environmental conditions and shocks (see Masson, 1999, Moreno and Trehan, 
2000), or having economic and political similarities (see Sachs, Tonell, Velasco, 
1996, Hartmann, Straetmans and de Vries, 2004) are more likely to experience a cri-
sis with one another. The third channel consists in tight financial linkages, arguing 
e.g. that investors might adjust their portfolio allocation in case of a financial crisis in 
one country. Having the same major creditors in common with the crisis country 
could thus lead to higher vulnerability in the respective country as well (see Kaminsky 
and Reinhart, 2000, Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001, or Caramazza, Ricci and 
Salgado, 2004). A thorough assessment of how to measure and include contagion in 
EWSs is offered by Fratzscher (2003). 
In order to assess possible effects on performance results, we add two conta-
gion variables to our analyses, one for capturing global, the other for regional linkage. 
In contrast to other studies, however, which consider quite complex measures of fi-
nancial and real contagion, we decide to lighten the gathering of contagion. We 
therefore rely on Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996) and construct the new vari-
ables in the following manner: 
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The contagion variable takes the value of one, if in another country of the sam-
ple or another country of the region, respectively, a currency crisis occurs; otherwise 
it takes the value of 0.  
Table 9 shows the results of our logit model estimation including contagion. 
Only the regional contagion variable is significant at the 1 % level and its inclusion 
seems to improve the estimated logit model slightly. Table 10 confirms this assump-
tion. Taking a look at the in- and out-of-sample performance of two logit alternatives 
with and without contagion, the trade-off between a slightly higher percentage of cor-
rectly called crises at the cost of slightly more false alarms is often recognizable. In 
one out of our cases, however, there is an unequivocal improvement. 
We conclude that the inclusion of a simple contagion dummy based on geo-
graphic proximity can capture some country linkages and induced contagion risks to 
improve model performance. Therefore, the possibility of grasping contagion should 
not be ignored when constructing an EWS. 
 
6 Conclusions 
Financial crises are among the most unwanted manifestations of the present in-
ternational financial markets. Thus, much emphasis has been given to the develop-
ment of EWSs in order to understand sources of crises or even better to avoid their 
outbreak. This research has been so fruitful that there are nowadays plenty of ap-
proaches available. Which approach, however, is most appropriate? Or to be less 
ambitious: what can we learn of this work, what should policy-makers do in this re-
spect? 
This paper addresses exactly these questions by conducting robustness tests 
that go beyond earlier tests of such kind. In a nutshell, we find that reliable progress 
of new approaches is much smaller than usually claimed. A plausible explanation for 
this fact may be that findings are quite sensitive to their exact empirical specification: 
depending on the sample, the time period, the crisis definition, the method of variable 
aggregation and the variables chosen, there is always a different model at the top. In 
other words: there is no single best performing model for all circumstances. So, what 
can users of an EWS do? 
We assess the appropriateness of competing approaches by taking the view-
point of a user who has two requirements which seem to be self-evident: Any EWS 
applied should be robust and the approach has to be practical. Under these condi-  20
tions we come to five insights: First, EWSs are useful as they help to identify and 
even forecast fundamental origins of currency crises. Second, the crisis definition 
should not be too narrow and not too complicated, which is why we favor the KLR 
definition. Third, multivariate methods underlying EWSs do not differ too much re-
garding their performance, but a binary logit model seems slightly superior to others 
and at the same time easy to handle. Fourth, there is contagion in international finan-
cial markets and a practical way to roughly capture this effect is adding a regional 
contagion variable to the set of fundamental variables. Fifth, instability in fundamental 
relations can be addressed by downsizing samples, for example, by the application 
of regional or time period restrictions. This will help to get somewhat better results. 
Overall, it may be useful to put the research on EWSs into a broader perspec-
tive: What we try to achieve here is to forecast larger exchange rate changes by ap-
plying a fundamental model. Empirical exchange rate research has shown, however, 
that rewards to this task can only be meager, as there are no reliable exchange rate 
models for horizons up to a year or even longer (Sarno and Taylor, 2002). Seen from 
this perspective, the performance of EWSs is surprisingly good. An intuitive explana-
tion may understand this as an analogy to the finding that fundamentals matter for 
exchange rates as well in the case of a huge inflation differential between countries 
(Frankel and Rose, 1996a). This analogy, however, indicates a reverse side to the 
coin: the impact of fundamental influences is mostly complex, i.e. exchange rates do 
not always adjust immediately to even huge inflation differentials, and if fundamental 
imbalances become very obvious, markets react and fundamentals do not have fore-
casting power anymore. 
Consequently, the forecasting power of any EWS must be quite limited, as is 
the case with its robustness, too. One may be tempted to fine-tune EWSs more and 
more but our results provide evidence against high expectations in this respect. In-
stead, it seems advisable to be aware of the structural instability in this field and to 
practice the robust and practical insights that can be gained from earlier work. 
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Figure 1: Movements of different variables in crisis times
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Deviation of M2 / Res Growth Rate  in Crisis Periods 










Deviation of CA / GDP (Level) in Crisis Periods 
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  Notes: (1) The graphs show the deviation in course of the respective variable in a 24-months window before and 
after the crisis from its average value in calm periods. Results are calculated concentrating on the original KLR 
sample, but they are similar when enlarging the sample to 28 countries as presented later on (see 2.3). Except 
for M2 / reserves (level) and CA / GDP (level) as well as the real exchange rate, the variables indicate growth 
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Deviation of Reserves Growth Rate in Crisis Periods 
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Table 1: In-sample
1 performance of univariate indicators:  






















































Real Exchange Rate  0.18  0.67  0.17  0.65  0.25  0.56  0.23  0.55 
Exports  0.59  0.38  0.66 0.31 0.65 0.33 0.73  0.28 
Reserves  0.50  0.41  0.46 0.39 0.48 0.40 0.49  0.36 
M2 / Reserves  0.56  0.38  0.50  0.37  0.58  0.35  0.55  0.33 
M2 / Reserves (Level)  0.55  0.39  0.53  0.35  0.57  0.34  0.58  0.32 
CA / GDP (Level)  0.51  0.45  0.49  0.37  0.47  0.43  0.43  0.39 
Notes: (1) The sample compromises the original KLR sample, i.e. data from 20 countries for the period from 
January 1970 to April 1995. (2) The extended sample contains Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Denmark, 
Finland, Greece, India, Indonesia, Israel, Colombia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Phil-
ippines, Portugal, Sweden, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, Uruguay and Vene-
zuela. (3) Except for M2 / reserves (level) and CA / GDP (level) as well as the real exchange rate, the vari-
ables indicate growth rates in reference to the same month of the previous year. The real exchange rate is 
expressed as deviation of its deterministic trend. (4) The noise-to-signal ratio shows the number of bad sig-
nals as a share of possible bad signals, divided by the number of good signals as a share of possible good 
signals. (5) The conditional probability indicates the probability of a crisis in a 24 months window after the 
respective indicator issued a signal. 
 
 
Table 2: Two logit model alternatives relying on the KLR sample  
 
 
Binomial Logit Model  
with Variables Entering in Form of 
Binary 0-1 Signals 
Binomial Logit Model  
with Variables Entering in Form of   





ß  Significance Coefficient
Odds Ratio 
e
ß   Significance
Real Exchange Rate  1.976  7.213  0.000  -0.019  0.981  0.000 
Exports  0.483  1.621 0.000  -0.408  0.665 0.001 
Reserves  0.685  1.983 0.000  -0.368  0.692 0.000 
M2 / Reserves (Level)  0.474  1.606  0.000  0.038  1.039  0.000 
           
No. of Observations  5065      5065     
Pseudo-R
2  0.14     0.09    
Notes: (1) Exports and reserves are expressed as growth rates in reference to the respective month of the 
previous year, whereas M2 / reserves is a level consideration. The real exchange rate is expressed as devia-
tion of its deterministic trend. 
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Table 3: In- and out-of-sample
1 performance  
of two logit model alternatives and a composite indicator benchmark 
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in Form of 
Continuous 
Values 
Goodness-of-Fit            
(50% Cut-Off)           
Percent of Crisis Periods 
Correctly Called
3  23 27  10 24  20 2 
False Alarms as Percent of 
Total Alarms
4  40 34  23 76  76  90 
Percent of Tranquil Periods 
Correctly Called
5  94 95  99 83  79  94 
Percent of Observations 
Correctly Called  70 77  75 73  64  71 
Goodness-of-Fit            
(25%  Cut-Off)           
Percent of Crisis Periods 
Correctly Called
3  30 53  75 25  39  70 
False Alarms as Percent of 
Total Alarms
4  45 56  63 77  72  72 
Percent of Tranquil Periods 
Correctly Called
5  92 76  53 82  67  38 
Percent of Observations 
Correctly  Called  76 70  59 72  60  46 
Notes: (1) ) The period from January 1970 to April 1995 is considered as in-sample. The out-of-sample period 
ranges from May 1995 to December 2002. (2) In order to assure comparability, the composite Indicator con-
tains the same 4 variables that enter the logit models. (3) A crisis signal is considered as correct, if the esti-
mated crisis probability is above the cut-off probability, and a crisis is coming up in the next 24 months. (4) A 
false alarm is an observation where the estimated crisis probability is above the cut-off probability, but no crisis 
is coming up in the next 24 months. (5) A signal for a tranquil period is considered as correct, if the estimated 
crisis probability is underneath the cut-off probability, and no crisis is coming up in the next 24 months. 
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Table 4: Mean value comparison


























Real Exchange Rate  1.221  2.028  -7.654  10.608  Yes/0.000 
Exports  0.153  0.176 0.110 0.150 Yes/0.000 
Reserves  0.290  0.313 0.176 0.373 Yes/0.000 
M2 / Reserves  0.082  0.064  0.196  -.0173  Yes/0.000 
M2 / Reserves (Level)  3.067  2.570  4.363  2.775  Yes/0.000 
CA / GDP (Level)  -0.022  -0.020  -0.029  -0.018  Yes/0.000 
Notes: (1) The mean value comparison comprises data of the original KLR sample. We consider 24 months 
before and after a crisis, respectively. Alternative shortenings of the time window to two times 12 months un-
veils similar results. (2) Analogous to Table 1, Note 3. 
 
 
Table 5: In- and out-of-sample
1 performance:  
A binomial and a multinomial logit model in comparison 
 
























Goodness-of-Fit (50% Cut-Off)         
Percent of Crisis Periods Correctly Called
4 27  27  20  21 
False Alarms as Percent of Total Alarms
5 34 33  76  75 
Percent of Tranquil Periods Correctly Called
6 95  94  79  75 
Percent of Observations Correctly Called  77  71  64  59 
Goodness-of-Fit (25% Cut-Off)        
Percent of Crisis Periods Correctly Called
4 53  30  39  21 
False Alarms as Percent of Total Alarms
5 56 38  72  75 
Percent of Tranquil Periods Correctly Called
6 76  92  67  75 
Percent of Observations Correctly Called  70  71  83  59 
Notes: (1) As in Table 3. (2) The independent variables enter the binomial and the multinomial logit model in 
binary 0-1 form. Calculations with independent variables entering in form of continuous values reveal weaker 
results and are thus not explicitly considered here. (3) Shortening the considered time windows to 12 months 
before and after the crisis, respectively, disclose similar, though even slightly worse results that are not shown 
here. (4)-(6) Analogous to Table 3, Notes (3)-(5). 
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Table 6: In- and out-of-sample
1 performance of binomial logit models: 
Different crisis definitions and KLR sample 
 
 In-Sample  Out-of-Sample 








Goodness-of-Fit (50% Cut-Off)         
Percent of Crisis Periods Correctly Called
2 35  4  17  3 
False Alarms as Percent of Total Alarms
3 33 30 89 50 
Percent of Tranquil Periods Correctly Called
4 93  100  70  99 
Percent of Observations Correctly Called  75  81  61  84 
Goodness-of-Fit (25% Cut-Off)         
Percent of Crisis Periods Correctly Called
2 54  37  29  16 
False Alarms as Percent of Total Alarms
3 49 64 86 89 
Percent of Tranquil Periods Correctly Called
4 78  84  63  76 
Percent of Observations Correctly Called  71  75  57  67 
Notes: (1) The sample only comprises countries which experienced a crisis. Applying the FR definition, these 
are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile Indonesia, Israel, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Turkey, Uruguay 
and Venezuela of the (small) original KLR sample, plus Pakistan, Sri Lanka and South Africa, being part of the 
expanded one. In-sample analyses refer to the period from January 1970 to April 1995. The preceding 92 
months till December 2002 are considered as out-of-sample. (2)-(4) Analogous to Table 3, Notes (3)-(5). 
 
 
Table 7: In- und out-of-sample
1 performance of a binomial logit model after sample split up
2, 
KLR definition and KLR sample 
 





America Asia  Europe
Goodness-of-Fit (50% Cut-Off)             
Percent of Crisis Periods Correctly Called
3 40  5  20  37  0  0 
False Alarms as Percent of Total Alarms
4  39  26 33 79  0 100 
Percent of Tranquil Periods Correctly Called
5 92  100 96  65 100 99 
Percent of Observations Correctly Called  80  80  74  59  69  79 
Goodness-of-Fit (25% Cut-Off)             
Percent of Crisis Periods Correctly Called
3  60  39 89 41 27 92 
False Alarms as Percent of Total Alarms
4  53  60 70 79 48 80 
Percent of Tranquil Periods Correctly Called
5  78  85 18 61 89  8 
Percent of Observations Correctly Called  74  75  38  57  69  25 
Notes: (1) As in Table 3. (2) The expanded KLR sample is split into three regional sub samples. "Latin Amer-
ica" covers Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela, "Asia" contains 
India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Pakistan, Sri Lanka as well as Singapore, and Den-
mark, Finland, Greece, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Spain and Turkey are considered separately as "Europe". 
Israel and South Africa are dropped from consideration. (3)-(5) As in Table 3. 
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Table 8: In-sample
1 performance of a binomial logit model: 
Shortening samples to ten year periods 
 
 1970-1995 1970-2002
2 1970-1980 1981-1990 1991-2002
2
Goodness-of-Fit (50% Cut-Off)           
Percent of Crisis Periods Correctly Called
3  27 25 44 22  3 
False Alarms as Percent of Total Alarms
4  34 47 34 42 52 
Percent of Tranquil Periods Correctly Called
5  95 90 94 93 99 
Percent of Observations Correctly Called  77  69  83  71  68 
Goodness-of-Fit (25% Cut-Off)           
Percent of Crisis Periods Correctly Called
3  53 40 54 52 98 
False Alarms as Percent of Total Alarms
4  56 57 40 54 67 
Percent of Tranquil Periods Correctly Called
5  76 84 90 73  4 
Percent of Observations Correctly Called  70  73  82  67  35 
Notes: (1) The in-sample period comprises each indicated range. (2) Crises are calculated according to the 
KLR crisis definition for the sample from January 1970 to April 1995. For the period from May 1995 to Decem-
ber 2002, thresholds of the original crisis definition are used. (3)-(5) Analogous to Table 3, Notes (3)-(5).  
 
 
Table 9: Binomial logit model
1 including contagion 
 
Variable  Coefficient  Odds Ratio e
ß Significance 
Real Exchange Rate  1.962  7.115  0.000 
Reserves 0.426  1.531  0.000 
Exports 0.661  1.937  0.000 
M2 / Reserves (Level)  0.624  1.866  0.000 
Regional Contagion  0.397  1.488  0.002 
      
No. of Observations  4761     
Pseudo-R
2 0.15     
Notes: (1) The variables enter the logit model in the binary 0-1 form. 
 
 
Table 10: In- and out-of-sample
1 performance 
of logit model alternatives with and without contagion 
 






















Goodness-of-Fit (50% Cut-Off)         
Percent of Crisis Periods Correctly Called
2 27  28  20 21 
False Alarms as Percent of Total Alarms
3 34  35 76  74 
Percent of Tranquil Periods Correctly Called
4 95  95  79  79 
Percent of Observations Correctly Called  77  77  64  64 
Goodness-of-Fit (25% Cut-Off)         
Percent of Crisis Periods Correctly Called
2 53  47  39 33 
False Alarms as Percent of Total Alarms
3 56  53 72  70 
Percent of Tranquil Periods Correctly Called
4 76  81  67  73 
Percent of Observations Correctly Called  70  73  60  62 
Notes: (1)-(4) Analogous to Table 3, Notes (1) and (3)-(5).   30
Annex 1: Overview of different identified crises
1 
 












Crisis Definition   KLR  KLR  KLR  KLR  FR  BF  BF 
Period  1970-1995  1970-1995  1970-1995  1970-2002  1970-2002  1970-1995 1970-2002 1970-1995 1970-2002 
Country Sample  Small  Expanded  Expanded  Expanded Expanded  Small  Small Expanded  Expanded 
Argentina  Jun 70  Mar 75  Mar 75  Mar 75  Mar 75  Jun 75  Jun 75  Jun 75  Jun 75 
   Jun 75  Jul 82  Jun 75  Jun 75  Jun 75  Dec 83  Dec 83  Jul 82  Jul 82 
   Feb 81  Apr 89  Nov 76  Nov 76  Nov 75  Apr 89  Apr 89  Apr 89  Apr 89 
   Jul 82  Dec 89  Jul 82  Jul 82  Mar 76  Dec 89  Dec 89  Dec 89  Dec 89 
   Sep 86    Dec 83  Dec 83  Nov 76         
   Apr 89    Apr 89  Apr 89  Apr 81          
   Feb 90    Feb 90  Feb 90  Jan 82           
           Jul 82           
           Oct 87           
           Apr 89           
           Jul 89           
           Dec 89           
           Jan 91           
           Jan 02           
Bolivia  Nov 82  Nov 82  Nov 82  Nov 82  Oct 72  Nov 82  Nov 82  Nov 82  Nov 82 
   Nov 83  Nov 83  Sep 85  Apr 84  Feb 82  Feb 85  Feb 85  Apr 84  Apr 84 
   Sep 85  Sep 85    Aug 84  Nov 82  Sep 85  Sep 85  Feb 85  Feb 85 
         Nov 84  Nov 83        Sep 85  Sep 85 
         Sep 85  Apr 84           
           Aug 84           
           Nov 84           
           Feb 85           
           May 85           
           Sep 85           
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Crisis Definition   KLR  KLR  KLR  KLR  FR  BF  BF 
Period  1970-1995  1970-1995  1970-1995  1970-2002  1970-2002  1970-1995 1970-2002 1970-1995 1970-2002 
Country Sample  Small  Expanded  Expanded  Expanded Expanded  Small  Small Expanded  Expanded 
Brazil  Feb 83  Sep 82  Sep 82  Sep 82  Dec 79  Sep 82  Sep 82  Sep 82  Sep 82 
   Nov 86  Mar 90  Nov 89  Nov 89  Feb 83  Jan 83  Jan 83  Nov 89  Nov 89 
   Jul 89  Nov 90  Nov 90  Feb 90  May 87  Jan 87  Jan 87  Nov 90  Nov 90 
   Nov 90  Oct 91    Nov 90  Jun 89  Jan 90  Nov 89    Sep 98 
   Oct 91      Jan 99  Dec 89  Nov 90  Feb 90    Jan 99 
           Oct 91    Nov 90     
           Jan 99    Sep 98     
           Sep 02     Jan 99     
            Apr  00    
Chile  Dec 71  Jul 71  Jul 71  Jul 71  Jul 71  Jul 71  Jul 71  Jul 71  Jul 71 
   Aug 72  Sep 72  May 73  May 73  Sep 72  Dec 74  Dec 74  May 73  May 73 
   Oct 83  May 73  Oct 73  Oct 73  May 73        Dec 74  Dec 74 
   Dec 74  Dec 74  Jul 85  Jul 85  Oct 73           
   Jan 76  Jul 85      Dec 74           
   Aug 82        Mar 75           
   Sep 84        Jul 85           
Colombia  Mar 83  Jan 85  Jan 85  Jan 85    Jan 84  Sep 74  Jan 84  Jan 84 
   Feb 85    Apr 85  Apr 85    Apr 84  Jan 84  Apr 84  Apr 84 
         Aug 95    Jan 85  Apr 84  Jan 85  Jan 85 
         Sep 98       Jan 85     
        Aug  99        
        Jul  02        
Denmark  May 71  Jun 73  Mar 80  Jul 75    Jul 76  Jul 76  Jul 76  Jul 76 
   Jun 73  Nov 79  Mar 91  Nov 78    Dec 84  Dec 84  Dec 84  Dec 84 
   Nov 79  Aug 93    Mar 80        Jan 93     
   Aug 93      Mar 91             
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Crisis Definition   KLR  KLR  KLR  KLR  FR  BF  BF 
Period 1970-1995  1970-1995  1970-1995  1970-2002  1970-2002  1970-1995  1970-2002  1970-1995  1970-2002 
Country Sample  Small  Expanded  Expanded  Expanded Expanded  Small  Small Expanded  Expanded 
Finland  Jun 73  Jun 73  Nov 78  Nov 78     Aug 86  Aug 86  Aug 86  Aug 86 
   Oct 82  Apr 77  Oct 82  Oct 82     Oct 91  Oct 91  Oct 91  Oct 91 
   Nov 91  Oct 82  May 86  May 86              
   Sep 92  Sep 92  Mar 91  Mar 91              
       Oct 91  Oct 91              
       Sep 92  Sep 92              
       Feb 93  Feb 93              
Greece    Jan 83  Jan 83  Jan 83           Mar 90  Mar 90 
     Oct 85  Sep 84  Sep 84           Apr 91  Jan 01 
       Oct 85  Oct 85              
      May 89  May 89           
         Jan 01              
India    Jul 91  Apr 91  Apr 91           Dec 90  Dec 90 
     Mar 93  Jul 91  Jul 91             Apr 91 
       Mar 93  Mar 93              
Indonesia  Nov 78  Nov 78  Apr 70  Nov 78  Nov 78  May 75  Mar 75  May 75  May 75 
   Apr 83  Apr 83  Nov 78  Sep 86  Apr 83  Mar 83  Mar 83  Mar 83  Mar 83 
   Sep 86  Sep 86  Apr 83  Dec 97  Sep 86     Jan 98     
       Sep 86  May 98  Dec 97          
           May 98           
Israel  Nov 74  Nov 74  Aug 71  Aug 71  Nov 74  Jul 84  Jul 84  Nov 77  Nov 77 
   Nov 77  Nov 77  Nov 74  Nov 74  Nov 77    Dec 88  Oct 83  Oct 83 
   Oct 83  Oct 83  Sep 75  Sep 75  Oct 83       Jul 84  Jul 84 
   Jul 84  Jul 84  Nov 77  Nov 77              
       Aug 83  Aug 83              
       Dec 88  Dec 88              
Korea    Jun 71  Jun 71  Jun 71  Dec 97        Dec 71  Dec 71 
     Dec 74  Dec 74  Jan 80           Jul 74  Jul 74 
    Jan 80  Jan 80  Nov 97        Oct 74  Oct 74 
                Jan 86  Jan 86 
               Dec  87  Dec  87 
                 Nov  97   33












Crisis Definition   KLR  KLR  KLR  KLR  FR  BF  BF 
Period 1970-1995  1970-1995  1970-1995  1970-2002  1970-2002  1970-1995  1970-2002  1970-1995  1970-2002 
Country Sample  Small  Expanded  Expanded  Expanded Expanded  Small  Small Expanded  Expanded 
Malaysia  Jul 75  Nov 73  Nov 73  Jul 97     Dec 94  Feb 82  Dec 92  Dec 92 
     Nov 78  Jul 75  Dec 97        Dec 92  Dec 94  Dec 94 
     Mar 80  Nov 78          Dec 94    Jul 97 
     Feb 85  Mar 80          Jul 97    Jan 98 
     Dec 92  Feb 85               
       Dec 92                
Mexico  Sep 76  Sep 76  Sep 76  Sep 76  Sep 76  Sep 76  Sep 76  Sep 76  Sep 76 
   Feb 82  Feb 82  Feb 82  Feb 82  Feb 82  Jun 82  Feb 82  Feb 82  Feb 82 
   Dec 82  Dec 82  Dec 82  Dec 82  Dec 82  Dec 94  Jun 82  Jul 82  Jul 82 
   Dec 94  Dec 94  Dec 87  Dec 87  Dec 87     Mar 90  Dec 82  Dec 82 
       Dec 94  Dec 94  Dec 94     Dec 94  Dec 94  Dec 94 
Norway  Jun 73  Jun 73  Nov 78  Nov 78     Nov 77  Nov 77  Nov 77  Nov 77 
   Feb 78  Feb 78  Jan 81  May 86     Nov 92  Nov 92  Nov 78  Nov 78 
   May 86  May 86  May 86  Mar 91        Dec 96  Nov 92  Nov 92 
   Dec 92  Nov 92  Mar 91  Nov 92        Dec 97    Dec 96 
       Nov 92  Dec 97        Jun 99    Dec 97 
         Dec 01        Oct 00    Jun 99 
                 Jul 01    Oct 00 
            Dec  01   Jul  01 
                Dec  01 
Pakistan    May 72  May 72  May 72  May 72        May 72  May 72 
                    Oct 90  Oct 90 
Peru  Jun 76  Jun 76  Sep 88  Sep 88  Jun 76  Sep 88  Sep 88  Sep 88  Sep 88 
   Oct 83  Oct 83      Oct 77  Aug 90  Aug 90  Aug 90  Aug 90 
           Oct 87           
           Sep 88           
           Jan 89           
           Aug 90           
Philippines  Feb 70  Oct 83  Feb 70  Feb 70  Feb 70  Sep 83  Sep 83  Sep 83  Sep 83 
   Oct 83  Jun 84  Oct 83  Oct 83  Oct 83  Jan 90  Feb 85  Jan 90  Jun 84 
   Jun 84  Feb 86  Jun 84  Jun 84  Jun 84     Jan 90    Jan 90 
      Feb 86  Feb 86           
         Dec 97               34












Crisis Definition   KLR  KLR  KLR  KLR  FR  BF  BF 
Period 1970-1995  1970-1995  1970-1995  1970-2002  1970-2002  1970-1995  1970-2002  1970-1995  1970-2002 
Country Sample  Small  Expanded  Expanded  Expanded Expanded  Small  Small Expanded  Expanded 
Portugal    Mar 76  Feb 77  Feb 77              
     Feb 77  Jun 82  Jun 82              
     Jun 82  Jun 83  Jun 83              
     Jun 83  Mar 91  Mar 91              
         Oct 92              
Singapore    Dec 70  Dec 70  Dec 70           Dec 70  Dec 70 
     Jul 75  Jul 75  Jul 75           Jul 75  Jul 75 
     Nov 78  Nov 78  Mar 80           Mar 80  Mar 80 
     Mar 80  Mar 80  Dec 97             Oct 97 
         May 98             Jan 98 
                May  98 
South Afrika    Sep 76  Sep 75  Sep 75  Aug 85           
     Jul 84  Jul 84  Jul 84              
     Aug 85  Oct 84  Oct 84              
     May 86  Aug 85  Aug 85              
       May 86  May 86              
         Apr 96              
         Jun 98              
        Dec  01        
Spain  Feb 76  Jun 73  Mar 80  Mar 80     Jun 77  Jun 77  Jun 72  Jun 72 
   Jul 77  Feb 76  Mar 83  Mar 83     Oct 82  Oct 82  Oct 82  Oct 82 
   Dec 82  Jul 77  Mar 91  Mar 91     Mar 83  Mar 83  Mar 83  Mar 83 
   Sep 92  Mar 83  Sep 92  Sep 92     Sep 92  Sep 92  Sep 92  Sep 92 
   May 93  Sep 92    Jul 93       Dec 98    Dec 98 
     Mar 95                 
Sweden  Aug 77  Aug 77  Aug 77  Aug 77     Oct 76  Oct 76  Oct 76  Oct 76 
   Sep 81  Sep 81  Mar 91  Mar 91     Feb 85  Feb 85  Feb 85  Feb 85 
   Oct 82  Oct 82  Nov 92  Nov 92     Aug 92  Aug 92  Aug 92  Aug 92 
   Nov 92  Nov 92  Feb 93  Feb 93     Nov 92  Nov 92  Nov 92  Nov 92 
                 Nov 96    Nov 96 
Sri Lanka    Nov 77  Nov 77  Nov 77  Nov 77        Apr 75  Apr 75 
         Jul 98           Nov 77  Nov 77 
                      Jul 90   35












Crisis Definition   KLR  KLR  KLR  KLR  FR  BF  BF 
Period 1970-1995  1970-1995  1970-1995  1970-2002  1970-2002  1970-1995  1970-2002  1970-1995  1970-2002 
Country Sample  Small  Expanded  Expanded  Expanded Expanded  Small  Small Expanded  Expanded 
Thailand  Nov 78  Nov 78  Nov 78  Nov 78     Nov 78  Nov 78  Nov 78  Nov 78 
   Jul 81  Jul 81  Jul 81  Jul 81     Oct 79  Oct 79  Oct 79  Oct 79 
   Nov 84  Nov 84  Nov 84  Jul 97     Oct 80  Oct 80  Oct 80  Oct 80 
       Feb 85  Nov 97     Apr 81  Apr 81  Apr 81  Apr 81 
                 Jul 97    Jul 97 
                 Nov 97    Nov 97 
Turkey  Aug 70  Aug 70  Aug 70  Aug 70  Aug 70  Jan 80  Jan 80  Jan 80  Jan 80 
   Jan 80  Jan 80  Jan 80  Jun 79  Mar 78  Dec 81  Dec 81  Dec 81  Mar 94 
   Mar 94  Mar 94  Mar 91  Jan 80  Jun 79  Mar 94  Jul 83  Mar 94  Feb 01 
       Mar 94  Mar 94  Jan 80     Mar 94     
         Feb 01  Apr 94           
           Feb 01           
Uruguay  Dec 71  Mar 72  Mar 72  Mar 72  Mar 72  Nov 82  Nov 82  Nov 82  Nov 82 
   Oct 82  Nov 82  Nov 82  Nov 82  Nov 82  Nov 84  Nov 84  Nov 84  Nov 84 
         Jul 02  Jul 02     Jul 02    Jul 02 
Venezuela  Feb 84  Mar 84  Feb 84  Feb 84  Feb 84  Feb 84  Feb 84  Feb 84  Feb 84 
  Dec 86  Dec 86  Dec 86  Dec 86  Dec 86  Dec 86  Dec 86  Dec 86  Dec 86 
   Mar 89  Mar 89  Mar 89  Mar 89  Mar 89  Mar 89  Mar 89  Mar 89  Mar 89 
   May 94      May 94  May 94  May 94  May 94  May 94  May 94 
   Dec 95      Dec 95  Dec 95     Apr 96    Dec 95 
         Feb 02  Apr 96     Feb 02    Apr 96 
           Feb 02          Feb 02 
           May 02           
Total Number of Crisis Periods for             
- Small Sample:   75  70  79  93  84 55  83  --  -- 
- Expanded  
  Sample:  --  91  104 
126 
88 -- --  76  101 
Notes: (1) Upon the existence of consecutive signals, only the first one is displayed and counted as a crisis. Moreover, according to the proposal of FR (1996, p. 
358), there must be at least 2 months in between two signals before being counted as two different crisis periods. 
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Deviation of real exchange 
rate (RER) from its deter-
ministic trend over the 













An overvalued exchange rate can 
often be seen as an indication of a 
possible devaluation of a currency 
and thus raises the risk of an up-
coming currency crisis. 
10 IFS  line  AE 
IFS line 64 
The real exchange rate is the result of mul-
tiplying the nominal exchange rate in price 
quotation, (indicating local currency per 
USD, line AE) with the consumer price in-
dex (CPI, line 64) of the USA divided by 
the local CPI (line 64). 
For calculating the trend, we optionally 
used either a linear, an exponential or a 
logarithmic function, taking the best fit into 
consideration.  
 
Exports  Growth rate in reference to 
the respective month of the 
preceding year 
A weak export sector implies a 
higher crisis probability as the 
government might have an incen-
tive to devaluate in order to em-
power the exports. 
 
10 IFS  line 
70_d 
-- 
Reserves  Growth rate in reference to 
the respective month of the 
preceding year 
A lost of international reserves 
stands for central bank market in-
tervention in order to stabilize the 
exchange rate. Thus a small or 
even negative growth rate height-
ens the risk of a crisis. 
 




Level of the ratio of M2 to 
reserves  
This indicator is considered in or-
der to assess the short-term li-
quidity and convertibility of a 
country’s currency. An increase of 
the ratio can occur due to a loss of 
international reserves or to ex-
traordinary monetary expansion. 




90 IFS  line  34 




The sum of money (line 34) and quasi-
money (line 35) divided by international re-
















Growth rate of the ratio of 
M2 to reserves in reference 
to the respective month of 
the preceding year  
Similar to M2 / reserves as a level 
consideration, this indicator also 
measures whether and to which 
degree a country is able to con-
vert domestic into foreign cur-
rency. An exceptionally high 
growth rate shows upcoming 
imbalances and thus heightens 
the crisis risk for a country. 
 
90 IFS  line  34 
IFS line 35 
IFS line 
1L.d 
The sum of money (line 34) and quasi-
money (line 35) is considered to form M2. 
After dividing M2 by international reserves 
(line 1L.d) the growth rate in reference to 






Ratio of current account to 
GDP in reference to the 
respective month of the 
preceding year 
Emerging Markets often exhibit 
high current account deficits. In 
order to finance these deficits they 
depend on foreign capital inflows. 
High deficits make the respective 
country vulnerable to expectation 
shifts and losses of confidence 
which might imply a sudden turn 
in capital inflows and thus sharp-
ens the risk of a crisis. 
 
10 IFS  line 
78AL 
IFS line 99B
Both variable series are firstly linearly in-
terpolated from annual and quarterly data, 
respectively, to monthly data. After dividing 
current account (line 78AL) by GDP (line 
99b), a moving average of the previous for 
quarters is calculated. The variable is 









IFS line 64 
 
Use of money market rate, discount rate, 
deposit rate or lending rate according to 
data availability with prioritization on the 
money market rate. 
Real interest rates are calculated with the 
help of the CPI (line 64). 
 
Notes: (1) All time series were transferred into Millions of USD. Replication efforts imply the reference to details given by Edison (2003, p. 47) and Berg and Pattillo 
(1999, p. 567). (2) The variable is not used as an indicator but enters the crisis definition of Bussiere and Fratzscher (2002). 
 
 